THE PERSONALITY CONSISTENCY SCALE

A Dissertation

by

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ABSTRACT

Perceived personality consistency is the degree to which an individual believes their personality is reliable across situations. Perceived personality consistency may contribute to the personality variability literature because it is a separate individual difference measure, rather than measuring change in personality trait self-reports. Rather than assessing actual change, perceived personality consistency involves the extent to which people *see themselves* changing. This individual difference measure should be associated with specific attitudes, cognitive styles, and behavior beyond that of trait measures. To capture this construct, I created a *Personality Consistency Scale* (PCS), assessing perceived personality consistency between contexts. Next, I assessed incremental validity in order to compare this scale to similar measures in variability and creativity research. Results found psychometric support for a 5-item inventory, which correlated with authenticity, indecision, meaning in life, and creative flexibility performance on the Alternative Uses Task. This scale explained variance above that of the conceptually similar Self-Pluralism scale and in conjunction with the personality trait openness to experience. These results suggest that perceived personality consistency should be assessed in addition to standard trait measures when predicting creative performance.

DEDICATION

To my father, Peter: you once told me that “any parent worth a damn” wanted their child to be better than them. All these years, your example of tireless sacrifice for the family has been my drive to start and finish this degree. I am not better than you--not yet, but I plan on spending my entire life working toward that goal. You and my mother, Annie, say that you made some mistakes parenting, but it is because of you both that I was even remotely prepared for life here. Thank you for creating a perfect template: nurturing the curiosity, patience, and determination that I needed to succeed.

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NOMENCLATURE

HEXACO	Honesty, Emotionality, eXtraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Openness to Experience scale
MIL	Meaning in Life
PCS	Personality Consistency Scale

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

LIST OF TABLES

1. INTRODUCTION

What kind of person are you at home? Do you behave differently when you are at work, at a social event, or when you were growing up? People change their behavior between contexts and over time (e.g., Helson & Wink, 1992; Kogan, 1990; Pervin, 1994; Roberts & DelVecchio, 2000). However, the extent to which they recognize this change might vary. On one hand, an individual may perceive themselves behaving differently between contexts; their perceptions of themselves may be that they are flexible—they change with the demands of the situation. Because their conception of their self is less consistent, their thoughts and behaviors may be more likely to objectively shift between contexts. On the other hand, the individual may perceive themselves as the same regardless of context.

Personality consistency can be assessed through reliability in personality traits across contexts within persons (Baird, Le, & Lucas, 2006). In the current work, I propose that *perceived* personality consistency is an individual difference characterized by rigidity in thinking: regardless of context, individuals view their personality as not changing between different situations. This may have implications for task performance, particularly on tasks that require flexibility in thinking. Specifically, individuals with high personality consistency, who view themselves rigidly, may generally have difficulty thinking from different perspectives, should they be required to. This may result in higher incidences of cognitive fixation-- counterproductive adherence to a plan or target solution (Smith, 1995)—because a person may become

stuck using their typical thinking strategy. However, lesser perceived consistency (i.e., regarding the self as flexible) may result in better performance on creative tasks because individuals believe themselves capable of thinking differently.

Perceived personality consistency is a valuable construct to consider because it assesses whether individuals believe they can change in accordance with the situation. This may translate into willingness to change, or a propensity to think from different perspectives; these beliefs may then influence thinking and behavior. Conceptually, personality consistency should be independent from personality scores; consistency involves assessment of variability, which should be unrelated to measures of central tendency. Once a scale is validated, the impact of perceived personality consistency on flexible thinking can be assessed.

1.1 Objective Personality Consistency between Contexts

Directly measuring personality consistency between contexts is uncommon, though other literatures hint at individuals acting differently across situations. Social psychology has often concerned itself with the study of *strong situations* influencing behavior. Historically, psychology's most famous studies, including the Milgram study (Milgram, 1963), the Stanford Prison Experiment (Zimbardo, 1973), and the like, all make use of the strong situation—individuals are put into otherwise extraordinary circumstances that push their behavior. Put in technical terms, a strong situation reduces the variability of possible response.

Various reviews of the literature have supported the inference that strong situations reduce variability in behavior across persons, thereby influencing behavior

despite the impact of personality (e.g., Cooper & Withey, 2009; Meyer et al., 2010). From decisions about traffic lights (Mischel, 1977) to whom to save in a fire (e.g., Burnstein, Crandall, & Kitayama, 1994), the strong situation has often moderated or completely suppressed personality. However, very little work has been done on the reverse, examining personality consistency's influence on the effects of the situation. Dalal and colleagues' (2015) untested 'personality strength' concept—an individual difference reducing variability in behavior across persons-- explores this idea. Personality strength modulates the variability in behavior across situations within persons, potentially dulling the impact of the situation on behavior.

The idea of personality consistency is not new. Bem and Allen (1974) urged psychologists to develop measures to predict who will be 'cross-situationally consistent.' Personality consistency has been studied in myriad forms throughout various literatures, such as self-monitoring and hardiness. For example, a meta-analysis of self-monitoring--an ability to regulate behavior to accommodate social situations akin to low personality consistency-- revealed an interaction of Big Five personality traits and self-monitoring on job performance. This interaction explained double the variance (10%) than the main effects alone (Barrick, Parks, & Mount, 2005). Hardiness—a trait characterized by motivation to turn stressful circumstances into opportunities for growth-- is another related construct to personality consistency (Bartone, 2000). However, it emphasizes flexibility (both behavioral and cognitive) to cope with stressful situations, similar to believing the self changes frequently. Hardy individuals change their perspectives to be more global, emphasizing how they can

adapt to overcome obstacles (Maddi, 2006). A meta-analysis of hardiness found negative relationships to strains, stressors, and other external factors after controlling for the Big Five personality traits (Eschleman, Bowling, & Alarcon, 2010). Because hardiness has similar elements to personality consistency, these findings suggest that personality consistency as an individual difference measure should be considered in conjunction with mean personality traits.

1.2 Perceived Consistency between Contexts

Perceived personality consistency is the degree to which an individual believes their personality is reliable across situations. I propose that this new construct could contribute to the personality literature because it is a separate individual difference measure rather than consistency in trait reports. Modern debates in personality consistency concern whether personality traits are essentially static (Costa & McCrae, 2006) or change in predictable patterns (Roberts, Walton, & Viechtbauer, 2006). However, perceived personality consistency involves the extent to which people *see themselves* changing. This individual difference measure should be associated with specific attitudes, cognitive styles, and behavior beyond that of trait measures. Low personality consistency, for example, could represent perceived flexibility (seeing oneself as able to adapt to multiple situations).

These beliefs can also translate to action. It has been generally accepted that perceptions influence behavior: "if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences" (Thomas & Thomas, 1928, p. 529). Robust effects in psychology, such as the self-fulfilling prophecy or the placebo effect (Merton, 1942; Moerman & Jonas,

2002), demonstrate how perception can influence reality. Thus perceived personality consistency could have consequences for how people think and behave, regardless of the actual consistency of their personality characteristics between contexts.

I define perceived consistency between contexts as the degree to which an individual believes their personality is identical regardless of context. Individuals low in perceived consistency between contexts may believe they try on certain personality traits like people try on clothes: an outfit for each occasion. Measuring this construct is useful because it has implications for cognitive fixation. If an individual perceives their personality as highly consistent, it is likely their problem-solving strategies are similarly linear. If these individuals are blocked, divergent thinking tasks may be problematic, where success involves flexibility.

No prior studies have directly asked participants to report the degree to which they change between contexts on a continuous measure. Extant research on the topic has focused on reports of particular traits within particular contexts, and this work suggests it is important to measure perceptions of cross-situational consistency. Research as early as Mischel's (e.g., 1968) has indicated that aggregating measures of personality ignores variability; context, he argued, is important for realistic domain-specific predictions of behavior. For example, Mischel and Shoda (1995) indicated individuals reported different perceptions of their personality under different hypothetical circumstances; by asking an individual to describe who they were under these contexts, the researchers found a distribution of trait consistency. Some individuals were consistent across most contexts, whereas others differed in their self-

perceptions across even similar contexts. Cross-culturally, researchers have found evidence of intra-individual variability in personality between contexts. Church and colleagues (2013), in a sample of five different nations, found that self-reports of personality three times daily varied as much as positive and negative affect. Further, variability differed among individuals; some individuals remained consistent, whereas others substantially changed. In sum, variability does not appear to be uniform; consistency can be seen in some participants, but not others.

Research in perceived consistency between contexts requires more attention. Perceived consistency between contexts lack formal measures entirely. Though it seems that some individuals perceive change across their lifetime or between contexts, others do not. Reviewing the literature, people may have varied beliefs about their personality consistency, like other individual differences.

Inconsistency in personality is not necessarily detrimental. In fact, lower perceived personality consistency might be beneficial in that it permits people to flexibly adapt to situations, especially between contexts. Failure to adapt to situations is often a symptom of social incompetence or rigidity (e.g., Chiu et al., 1995; Mischel & Shoda, 1998). However, past studies have not directly measured perceived personality consistency. Therefore, the first issue addressed in this investigation was to develop a measure of perceived personality consistency as an individual difference.

1.3 Construct Comparisons

In order to develop a valid scale, it is necessary to test construct validity on conceptually similar measures for scale development. Construct validity is defined as

"the degree to which a test measures what it claims, or purports, to be measuring" (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955; for a review: Haynes, Richard, & Kubany, 1995). This investigation utilized two specific subforms of construct validity—convergent and discriminant validity.

1.3.1 Convergent Validity

Convergent validity is reflected in the degree to which the construct correlates with variables the measure should relate to (Campbell, 1957). I selected scales which conceptually should relate to perceived personality consistency based on empirical studies in social and personality personality.

Authenticity. Authenticity—the feeling that an experience is fundamentally authored by the self—has well-established ties to personality variability in the literature. Sheldon, Ryan, Rawsthorne, & Ilardi (1997) indicated a strong relationship between self-consistency and authenticity. Authenticity has been tied to feeling consistent in within-subject designs of daily diary studies (e.g., Heppner et al., 2008). As such, I utilized the definitive measure of authenticity, Wood's (2008) Authenticity Scale in this investigation. I predicted that greater perceived personality consistency would result in higher authenticity; with the perception of rarely changing, an individual might perceive it easier to be true to his or her self.

While this variable sounds conceptually similar to personality consistency, an individual can be very inconsistent in their personality and still be authentic; individuals who pride themselves on their flexibility can perceive themselves as less consistent but still acting true to their Self. Furthermore, a large component of authenticity is self-

alienation, which is not included in the current conception of personality consistency. Being inconsistent in personality should not necessarily lead to self-alienation or being dominated by social others. Inconsistent perceptions may just mark sensitivity to subtle cues in themselves and others and recognition that their personality is different in specific situations (Mischel & Shoda, 1998). In summary, authenticity should not be identical to perceived personality consistency, but it should be strongly related.

Social flexibility. Research has indicated that greater flexibility in social environs may be related to adjusting one's goal priorities and future direction of the self (Crone & Dahl, 2012). It could be that self-reporting oneself as flexible may be associated with self-perceptions changing across situations. Studies have also indicated that self-reported flexibility (specifically, the HEXACO personality inventory; Lee & Ashton, 2004) may associate with creative behaviors, which may require thinking from diverse perspectives (Kinga, Paul, & Şefan, 2015). In this investigation, I chose the HEXACO's Flexibility subscale to represent social flexibility. The authors describe this subscale as assessing "one's willingness to compromise and cooperate with others. Low scorers are seen as stubborn and are willing to argue, whereas high scorers avoid arguments and accommodate others' suggestions, even when these may be unreasonable" (p. 335). This measure should correlate negatively with perceived personality consistency, such that greater perceived consistency predicts lower flexibility.

Indecision. The maladaptive postponing of decision-making—engaging in indecision—has been associated with a diffuse self (e.g., Berzonsky, 2008). Berzonsky

& Ferrari (1996) found that those with diffuse identities often resorted to decisional procrastination relative to more information-oriented individuals. Individuals high in indecision have difficulty completing tasks on time, but experimental work has concluded this is not from a cognitive detriment (e.g., Ferrari & Dovidio, 1997; Ferrari & Dovidio, 2000)—it is motivational, as people struggle with life choices. Taken together, these studies suggest those high in decisional procrastination may have less of a rigid idea of their personalities. As such, I selected the identical Decisional Procrastination scale (Mann et al., 1997) as a convergent validity measure. Indecision should negatively relate to perceived personality consistency - participants who see themselves as less consistent likely have more difficulty making decisions.

Meaning in Life. Early research in meaning in life has associated meaning with coherence—understanding purpose and taking meaning from events in life (e.g., Battista & Almond, 1973; Reker & Wong, 1988). Meaning in life studies do not necessarily implicate personality traits as predictors; recent studies have shown non-existent to moderate correlations with Big Five factors (e.g., Heintzelman & King, 2015; Schnell & Becker, 2006; Steger et al., 2006) It's more likely that personality *variability* is a stronger predictor. Some researchers have suggested that those with low presence of meaning in life and high searching for meaning in life have more fragmented or diffuse selves (e.g., Ogawa et al., 1997). Human and colleagues (2014) found that psychological adjustment, an indicator of high meaning in life, predicted individuals acting more in line with their personalities. Meaning in life should correlate with perceived personality consistency, such that greater perceived consistency is

associated with stronger feelings of meaning in life. As such, I selected the Meaning in Life scale (Steger et al., 2006) as a comparison metric for convergent validity.

1.3.2 Discriminant Validity

Discriminant validity tests whether the measure is unrelated to conceptually independent measures (Campbell, 1957). I selected a major paradigm in personality psychology to provide evidence of perceived personality consistency's independence from conventional personality measures.

The Big Five. Theoretically, personality traits should not be meaningfully, consistently correlated with perceived personality consistency, as personality consistency concerns variability, not central tendency. Prior research has determined that interactions between personality traits and personality variability meaningfully increases variance explained in behavior (e.g., Barrick, Parks, & Mount, 2005). Clifton and Kuper (2011) have implicated measures of personality variability as indicators of social behavior and interpersonal dysfunction separate from trait measures. This impact of variability can remain predictive even after statistically controlling for personality traits (e.g., Eschleman, Bowling, & Alarcon, 2010). Though past studies suggest that personality variability is important to consider in addition to central tendency, none have utilized a continuous measure directly measuring perceived personality consistency; therefore, I chose to include a measure of the Big Five to provide evidence of discriminant validity. I utilized a short, validated scale of the Big Five measures of personality to assess this form of validity: the mini-IPIP (Donnellan et al., 2006).

1.4 Perceived Consistency and Creative Thinking

Paired with construct validity, the second issue addressed in this investigation is the extent to which perceived personality consistency has implications for cognition: predictive validity. Specifically, I hypothesized that less perceived consistency would predict more globalized cognitive perspectives and perceptions of flexibility in the self. These relationships should stem beyond self-report and into behavior. This can be tested by correlating the developed scale with foundational tasks in the creativity literature, which have implications for cognition and flexibility. If perceived personality consistency between contexts can predict flexibility in creative performance better than other similar measures, then it has incremental validity.

I hypothesized that perceived personality consistency would be associated with creativity because past studies indicate creative individuals are more flexible. One quality that researchers have described in creative people is an *integration of dichotomies* (Barron, 1969). Creative individuals appeared highly flexible, in that they embodied ranges of personality traits *within themselves* (Barron & Harrington, 1981). Observational studies have characterized creative people as paradoxical in traits (Barron, 1965, 1969). They might be disciplined and systematic in pursuing their craft, but keep their workplace messy; they might have high levels of hardiness and mental strength, despite being neurotic. This suggests that creative individuals are ones that often assume different personality traits under different contexts, a component of (low) personality consistency and potentially flexibility.

This "integration of dichotomies" quality may also explain why no one five-factor personality trait has emerged as a reliable predictor of creativity. Many researchers have attempted to typify what makes a person creative or the personality traits that predispose individuals to excel in creative careers (e.g., Amabile, 1996; Shalley, Zhou, & Oldham, 2004; Wang & Cheng, 2010), but the findings are contradictory. Some studies have found that openness to experience predicts creativity, whereas other studies have found conscientiousness to predict creativity (Feist, 1998, 2010). Effect sizes between creative persons and comparison groups typically range from small (d = .20) to moderate (d = .50), according to DeVellis' (2012) standards. However, different types of creative people (i.e., artists vs. scientists) have different personality traits, indicating that no one personality factor consistently predicts creative performance (Cross, Cattell, & Butcher, 1967).

1.4.1 Components of Creativity

Though no one five-factor personality trait has predicted creativity performance, flexibility appears to be important. Several studies suggest that environments conducive to global and flexible processing result in the most creative individuals (e.g., De Dreu et al., 2011; Oldham & Cummings, 1996). Specifically, individuals engaging in tasks and workplaces framed to promote creativity thinking, as opposed to more controlling or detail-oriented environments, were associated with higher evaluations of creative performance by supervisors and more patent disclosures written—a common measure of creative output (Keller & Holland, 1983; Pelz & Andrews, 1966). Another study attempted to characterize the thinking style of creative individuals (Meneely &

Portillo, 2005). The researchers utilized the Herrmann Brain Dominance Instrument (Bunderson, Olson, & Herrmann, 1982) to typify individuals' perceived strategies in a creative task. Researchers differentiated between four cognitive styles: limbic (affective), cerebral (analytical), left (local), and right (global). Participants engaged in a creative task: design of an original piece of furniture for book storage. Results indicated that no one cognitive style predicted creative performance; however, perceived flexibility between the possible four styles did. If the individuals reported they were well-practiced in multiple styles, their actual scores were higher than if they were superior in any one cognitive style. This finding suggests that people who perceived themselves as utilizing multiple perspectives should be more effective in creativity tasks.

Creative self-efficacy—the belief that one can be creative (Amabile, 1983; Bandura, 1977, 1997)—is also positively correlated with scores on creative tasks (Schoen, 2015; Tierney & Farmer, 2002). Many studies suggest that stronger beliefs that one can think creatively and flexibly to solve a problem predict better outcomes (e.g., Gong, Huang, & Farh, 2009), although there is some evidence to the contrary (e.g., Reiter-Palmon et al., 2012). One study indicated that perceived flexibility (defined here as the perceived ability to produce ideas in multiple categories) was highly related to creative self-efficacy as well as higher motivation to achieve in class (Putwain, Kearsley, & Symes, 2012). Creative self-efficacy is related to increases in creative performance that persist over time, and it can be conferred with creativity training techniques in students and employees (Mathison & Bronnick, 2009; Tierney &

Farmer, 2011). Experimental studies characterizing the relationship between perception and performance suggest causal directionality. For example, in studies where individuals were influenced to believe they were creative, they offered more creative solutions to problems through flexible thinking (Locke et al., 1984; Redmond, Mumford, & Teach, 1993). Together, these findings reveal that making an individual believe they are flexible (i.e., able to think originally in multiple different categories) or creative often inspires actual creativity.

1.4.2 Measurement of Creativity

Some creativity studies use raters trained to assess multiple scores of creativity in order to sum them to a total score, indicating overall creative performance. Though measures and operationalization varies among studies, researchers have often used four facets to rate creativity of problem-solving: Fluency, Originality, Flexibility, and Elaboration. These measures have been featured in early studies of creativity (for a review, Guilford, 1967; Torrance, 1974) and have remained relevant in longitudinal studies (Cramond et al., 2005; Runco et al., 2010). Qualities of these performance measures are detailed below, as well as a hypothesis about its relation to perceived personality consistency.

Having high Fluency indicates generating a large number of solutions to problems. This skill can be important, as it suggests that individuals have the intrinsic motivation to be creative (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990; Gardner, 1993). Research also has found that considering intrinsic reasons to perform may be sufficient to boost creativity on the task (Greer & Levine, 1991). As such, individuals with low perceived

personality consistency may benefit in fluency, since it would be easier to consider reasons to perform that matter to them; however, since perceived personality consistency concerns itself with shifting perspectives, this association may be weak. As such, in this investigation, I hypothesized that creative fluency was unrelated to perceived personality consistency.

Originality is often scored by comparing each response to other responses from all participants. If a response occurs infrequently (usually by percentage of the overall dataset), the response is deemed original; some researchers also award additional points for unique responses or, instead, subjectively code all responses. Originality has often been inspired by thinking broadly cognitively or shifting self-perceptions to be more global (e.g., De Dreu et al., 2011; Friedman, et al., 2003). This appears similar to perceived personality consistency, in that lower consistency indicates a broader image of the self; as such, it is possible that lower perceived personality consistency could be modestly associated with originality. However, Fluency often influences Originality - having more responses may grant more originality points. To control for this contamination, Originality scores have sometimes been divided by an individual's Fluency score (e.g., Hocevar, 1979). I hypothesized that creative originality was modestly related to the PCS, such that lower perceived personality consistency was associated with more original responses.

Elaboration is defined as exploring an idea in detail. Defining a solution does not involve Elaboration; it must be detailed, bringing in specific elements in a visualized solution. Research has shown that Elaboration in some situations might be

weakly correlated with other creativity facets (Verhaeghen, Joorman, & Khan, 2005). Consider that on a timed task, elaborating necessarily prevents individuals from generating new ideas (Fluency) or from creating new, unique ideas (Originality). If the idea to be elaborated on is not a unique idea, this rumination might be detrimental to creative problem solving. However, if the idea to be elaborated on is both innovative and practical, elaboration would be indicative of creativity. I hypothesized that creative elaboration was unassociated with perceived personality consistency—elaboration does not represent an ability to think from multiple perspectives. It represents an ability to think deeply about one perspective.

Flexibility is defined as being able to make connections across domains and between ideas that seemed unconnected. Individuals with high Flexibility scores look at a challenge or generate options by examining a situation from multiple perspectives (Torrance, 1974). It is often thought of as a process measure—reframing perspectives until a suitable idea is found (e.g., Shah, Millsap, Woodward, & Smith, 2012). For example, one individual might offer solutions where an object is used as a weapon, building-block, musical instrument, and an art piece. Even if another individual offered as many solutions, but included only building-block-related solutions, they would score low in Flexibility. I hypothesized that high Flexibility would be closely tied to low perceived personality consistency; those with low perceived consistency should be able to generate ideas from multiple domains because they conceive of their selves similarly. Of the four creativity metrics, I expected this one to associate most with perceived personality consistency.

1.5 Overview of Studies

The present investigation developed a scale to measure perceived personality consistency and then explore the relationship of perceived personality consistency between contexts to creative cognition. There is no existing scale to measure perceived consistency as a continuous measure; therefore, my first objective was to create a Personality Consistency Scale (PCS), measuring perceived consistency between contexts. Study 1 was dedicated to creating a reliable and valid measure to be tested incrementally. PCS should be particularly important for creative thinking because of its proposed link to flexibility. I hypothesized PCS was correlated with other constructs selected above for convergent validity: authenticity, social flexibility, indecision, and meaning in life. For discriminant validity, I hypothesized that the PCS should not be highly correlated with any one personality trait. PCS may be associated with very predictable decision-making strategies; individuals may believe themselves to be very decisive across situations, authentic in how they act, and knowledgeable about their place in the world if they perceive their selves to be very consistent. However, in line with personality strength theory (Dalal et al., 2015), the PCS might not correlate strongly with any one five-factor personality trait because variability is complimentary but not necessarily contingent on central tendency.

Study 2 was primarily concerned with predictive validity and incremental validity. I first tested predictive validity of the PCS, measuring the association of perceived personality consistency between contexts and creative performance, focusing on the outcome of Flexibility on the alternative uses task. I then explored the

incremental validity of the PCS by comparing its performance relative to pre-existing measures of personality. Specifically, I hypothesized that lower PCS was associated with better performance on a creative task, even when compared to similar inventories such as the Self-Monitoring scale and Self-Pluralism scale.

2. STUDY 1: SCALE DEVELOPMENT AND VALIDATION

The first study was aimed at developing a perceived personality consistency measure. To prepare for the full study, two pilot studies were conducted. The aim of these pilots was to explore the existence of multiple factors in perceived personality consistency.

The initial pilot study (N = 30) included four subscales on the PCS. Two of the preliminary factors have been discussed extensively in past research on personality consistency: consistency across a lifetime (CAL: 10 items) and consistency between contexts (PCS: 7 items). However, I also included two exploratory subscales: a short-term consistency across time subscale (CAT: 6 items) and a subscale for belief in personality resilience (PR: 6 items). The CAT subscale examined perceived changes in personality within the past year. The PR subscale considered how difficult individuals perceived it was to change their personality. Individual items for this initial PCS are detailed in Appendix B. However, these initial items were either not reliable, did not load onto a singular factor, or did not correlate with other variables with which they conceptually should have correlated if the subscales were measuring what they were intended to measure. CAT—the subscale assessing perceived change across the last year-- did not correlate with CAL, even though both are measures of temporal personality consistency. PR—a scale involving perceived difficulty of changing one's personality—appeared to confuse participants, as the resulting distribution was uniform. Both of these exploratory subscales were removed in future designs. Examination of

alpha coefficients revealed that two items in the PCS did not correlate with other items on the subscale and were removed in future administrations of the scale.

In a second pilot (N = 30) with the remaining 15 items, a principle components analysis with Varimax Rotation found support for a two-factor model with groupings as predicted. Factor 1 appeared to represent Consistency across a Lifetime (CAL; 10 items). Factor 2 appeared to represent Consistency between Contexts (PCS; 5 items). However, even after combining the two pilot studies (N = 60), CAL correlated with no other exploratory variables. As such, this subscale was removed; further studies primarily explored the 5-item perceived consistency between contexts scale for PCS.

2.1 Participants

Undergraduate students from an introductory psychology subject pool participated for partial course credit (N = 113). This study was conducted fully online and outside the lab. As such, there was concern that students may not pay full attention to their questionnaires. In an attempt to remove inattentive participants, an a priori exclusion criterion of participants was created. I removed all participants who completed the survey in under 5 minutes and whose mean response on all Qualtrics items (with no reverse scoring) indicated they just clicked the same point on every questionnaire (n = 17). I removed outliers from consideration in analyses as defined by Cook's D scores. Cook's D (Cook, 1977) is a statistic used to indicate influential data points that may need to be checked for validity; though there are wide interpretations of which D values are acceptable, the most common metric is a Cook's D value of 1.00 or $4/N\text{-}k\text{-}1$. This may indicate a leverage point meriting removal. Some statisticians have

warned that such diagnoses should avoid hard numbers and to consult time series figures (Bollen & Jackman, 1990); therefore, for every data point removed, a time series figure illustrating the magnitude of the outliers is linked in the Appendices. After exclusions, 96 participants (53% female; M_{age} = 18.89, SD_{age} = 1.35) remained in the dataset.

2.2 Measures and Procedure

Participants accessed a secure, anonymous Qualtrics survey via SONA systems in exchange for partial course credit. Assigning credit was automated, such that researchers did not require and could not ascertain personally identifiable information. Participants first completed the Personality Consistency Scale (PCS). The survey was randomized after the Personality Consistency Scale, such that participants did not complete the scales in the same order. This structure prevented order effects. After completing all scales, participants responded to demographic questions.

The PCS consisted of five items, assessing perceived consistency between contexts. Participants were instructed to indicate the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with the statement regarding their own personalities. Participants responded on a 7-point Likert scale (1=strongly disagree; 7=strongly agree), where higher scores indicated greater perceptions of personality consistency. As such, the highest scoring individuals *perceived* that they were unlikely to change their behaviors across their lifetime or due to situational cues. A full listing of items can be found in Table 1.

2.2.1 Convergent Validity

The descriptive statistics and Cronbach's alphas for measures hypothesized to be related to the PCS can be found in Table 2.

Social flexibility. I measured self-reported flexibility via the Flexibility subscale (Appendix C) in the HEXACO Personality Inventory (Lee & Ashton, 2004). In the HEXACO, flexibility is seen as a facet of agreeableness. Responses to this 10-item subscale were collected on a 5-point scale (1=strongly disagree; 7=strongly agree). Flexibility's alpha in the HEXACO-PI study was .75. I expected that individuals lower in personality consistency would report higher flexibility, due to perceiving personality as more variable.

Meaning in Life. Presence and search for meaning in life were assessed with the Meaning in Life Questionnaire (MILQ; Steger et al., 2006). The MILQ is a 10-item inventory consisting of two subscales: Presence and Searching (Appendix D). Higher scores on the Presence subscale indicated more of a belief in meaningful existence or life purpose. Higher scores in the Searching subscale indicated less of this meaning or purpose. Participants reported their agreement with 10 statements on a 7-point scale (1=absolutely untrue; 7=absolutely true). Past studies indicated that the MILQ alphas were over .80. I expected that Purpose subscale responses would relate positively to personality consistency, since highly consistent individuals may have found their life purpose or a reason to act consistently across situations. However, I expected that Searching would indicate a perception of less consistency in personality; perceiving

oneself as having a wide range of personality may suggest an individual is searching for their place in the world.

Authenticity. I measured perceptions of authenticity with Wood and colleagues' (2008) Authenticity Scale (Appendix E). The Authenticity Scale is a 12-item 7-point scale (1 = does not describe me at all; 7 = describes me very well). Higher scores on the Authenticity scale indicated lower self-alienation, greater congruence between beliefs and behavior, and lower acceptance of external influence. Historically, test-retest reliability measures for the Authenticity scale are over .78 up to 4 weeks after testing (Wood et al., 2008).

Indecision. The Melbourne Decision Making Questionnaire (Mann et al., 1997) contains a subscale for indecision—defined as the maladaptive postponing of decision-making (Appendix F). This indecision subscale is a 5-item measure on a 7-point scale (1=strongly disagree; 7=strongly agree). Higher scores on this measure indicated greater indecision and delay of decision making. The original study reports an alpha of .81 for the Indecision subscale. This scale has been validated in the U.S., Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, among others. I hypothesized that the indecision scale would negatively relate to perceived personality consistency - participants who see themselves as less consistent were expected to have more difficulty making decisions.

Attitudinal Consistency. I created exploratory items that assessed non-clinical rigidity in beliefs. Though not validated, the measures may contribute to construct validity by testing whether the PCS highly correlated with attitude consistency,

specifically maintaining attitudes despite situational influence. There were 8 items presented on a 7-point Likert scale (1=strongly disagree; 7= strongly agree). Higher scores indicated that attitudes and beliefs were unlikely to shift. A complete listing of this exploratory measure is included in Appendix G.

2.2.2 Discriminant Validity

Mini-IPIP. Participants completed a short five-factor model personality questionnaire. The Mini-IPIP (Appendix H) consisted of 20 items, with four items per personality trait: extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and intellect (openness to experience). The Mini-IPIP is effective because of its concision and strong predictive relationship to the larger 50-item International Personality Item Pool (Donnellan et al., 2006). Responses were collected on a 7-point scale (1=very inaccurate; 7=very accurate). In five studies, the Mini-IPIP previously demonstrated internal consistency, with alphas well above .60. Correlations to the IPIP were often above .80, demonstrating the validity of this shorter, more practical scale. I expected that personality consistency would be unrelated to specific personality traits or have relatively modest relationships with personality factors like openness or neuroticism.

2.3 Results

2.3.1 Gender

Before assessing psychometric properties, I explored potential gender differences. The five-item PCS did not differ in males (M = 4.37, SD = .16) or females (M = 4.56, SD = .15), t (88) = .89, p = .38. Overall, consistent with predictions, there were no significant effects which might affect primary analyses.

2.3.2 Internal Consistency

I utilized Cronbach's alpha to measure internal consistency of the items. Internal consistency is a form of reliability analysis measuring the extent to which items proposed to measure the same general construct produce similar scores. The Cronbach's alpha for the PCS was .84. A listing of items and inter-item correlations for the PCS is reported in Table 3. Overall, the PCS performed well by Clark and Watson's (1995) standards, reaching an average inter-item consistency of .41. This fell within the recommended range (.40 to .50) for specific constructs in scale development.

2.3.3 Convergent Validity

All possible pair-wise correlations for Study 1 are reported in Table 4. PCS scores were negatively related to Flexibility, $r(94) = -.26$, $p = .03$. As expected, as perception of consistency increased, flexibility appeared to decrease. I conducted correlations between personality consistency subscales and the Meaning in Life subscales: Presence of Meaning and Searching for Meaning. Consistent with hypotheses, the PCS was associated with both MILQ subscales. The PCS and Presence of Meaning were positively related, $r(94) = .27$, $p < .01$; PCS and Searching for Meaning were negatively related, $r(94) = -.27$, $p < .01$. The PCS had a strong positive relationship with Authenticity, $r(94) = .48$, $p < .01$. As predicted, when participants reported higher consistency between contexts, they also reported feeling more authentic. The PCS scale was strongly associated with indecision scores, $r(94) = -.46$, $p < .01$. This aligned with predictions that indecision was negatively correlated with perception of personality consistency. There was a positive relationship between PCS and attitude

consistency, $r(94) = .31$, $p < .01$. Consistent with our exploratory hypotheses, participants perceived consistency was associated with lower self-report of shifting attitudes in the present day. Overall, the data appeared to fit predictions, lending support for the PCS's convergent validity.

2.3.4 Discriminant Validity

Zero-order correlations were conducted between each level of the Big Five and the two personality consistency variables. Extraversion ($r(94) = .13$, $p = .12$), Conscientiousness ($r(94) = .05$, $p < .61$), Agreeableness ($r(94) = -.11$, $p = .35$), and Openness ($r(94) = -.10$, $p = .20$) were unrelated to the PCS. Counter to predictions, Neuroticism was associated with perceived consistency between contexts, $r(94) = -.30$, $p < .01$. Cook's *D* indicated one outlier for removal (Appendix I), and excluding this outlier did not substantially alter the relationship, $r(94) = -.25$, $p = .02$.

I utilized a multiple regression with each personality factor (extraversion, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, openness) as predictors and each of the subscales as the outcome. We also approached the analysis in this matter because, despite the claim that the five factors of personality are orthogonal, there are often modest correlations among them; this sample was similar, as shown in Table 4. Similar criticisms for other five-factor models have been registered in the personality literature (see Block, 1995; Funder, 2001). We used multiple regression analyses to examine unique effects, controlling for other factors.

For PCS, neuroticism was significant predictor, controlling for the other four factors, $\beta = -.31$, $t(94) = -2.60$, $p < .05$. However, there were five leverage points

according to Cook's *D* above the exclusion criterion (Appendix J). Upon removal, neuroticism became non-significant, β = -.15, $t(89)$ = -1.26, p = .22. Extraversion (β = .12, $t(89)$ = 1.53, p = .13), Conscientiousness (β = .04, $t(89)$ = .39, p = .70), Agreeableness (β = .17, $t(89)$ = 1.63, p = .11), and Openness (β = .08, $t(89)$ = .78, p = .44) were unrelated to PCS. The internal consistency reliability for neuroticism was unacceptable by DeVellis' (2012) standards (α = 0.56); therefore, this result may have been spurious. For the most part, PCS also appeared weakly related to five-factor personality trait measures, lending some support for discriminant validity.

2.4 Discussion

The PCS measure developed in Study 1 demonstrated acceptable levels of reliability. The analyses bolstered the PCS's construct validity. For convergent validity, perceived consistency between contexts related to attitude consistency (+), flexibility (-), presence of meaning (+), searching for meaning (-), authenticity (+), and indecision (-). For discriminant validity, perceived personality consistency was not related to reported levels of personality traits (with the exception of Neuroticism, which had questionable internal consistency). Overall, the PCS was correlated in expected directions with these related variables. However, another study must assess predictive, incremental, and construct validity of the PCS with greater rigor. Specifically, the PCS associations should be compared with other similar measures to an outcome variable: creativity. Not only will this further validate the scale, but it will demonstrate, relative to other measures, how predictive of creativity the PCS can be.

3. STUDY 2: CONSISTENCY AND CREATIVITY

3.1 Predictive and Incremental Validity

Study 2 addressed two major psychometric concerns, the first of which was predictive validity-- the extent to which a score on a scale or test predicts scores on a criterion measure (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955). I predicted that perceived personality consistency would be associated with creativity because creative individuals are often characterized as flexible in their approach to problem-solving (e.g., Barron, 1969; Barron & Harrington, 1981). This suggests that creative individuals often assume different personality traits under different contexts, typical of low personality consistency.

I chose the alternative uses task, a prominent divergent thinking task, to operationalize creative performance. Divergent thinking tasks have been used as a measure of creative potential for decades (e.g., Torrance, 1966; Wallach & Kogan, 1965; Wilson, Gilbert, & Christensen, 1953). The alternative uses task consists of a timed activity in which participants must report as many alternative uses as they can for a common, household object. Considerable work has tested reliability and validity of the alternative uses task (for reviews: Runco, 2010; Runco & Acar, 2012). In line with the task, I collected data and utilized coders for the four measures of creativity: Fluency, Flexibility, Originality, and Elaboration. However, I predicted that the PCS would most be related to the task's Flexibility score. Provided the data was consistent with predictions, this would lend support for predictive validity of the PCS.

The other concern addressed in Study 2 was incremental validity of the PCS—whether it predicted outcomes better than existing inventories. Haynes and Lench (2003) summarize incremental validity as "the degree to which a measure explains or predicts some phenomena of interest, relative to other measures" (p. 457). The newly developed measure should have an effect on the phenomenon of interest, even controlling for similar effects from pre-existing measures. The authors note that, lacking a gold standard for comparison, a new scale should be compared to commonly used measures in a similar domain.

3.2 Construct Comparisons

For this investigation, I selected measures that appear similar to perceived personality consistency for comparison. Though they are somewhat similar to the conceptualization of the PCS, they harbor flaws which impede measuring perceived personality consistency directly.

3.2.1 Self-pluralism

The Self-Pluralism scale (McReynolds et al., 2000; Appendix K) is a measure of self-pluralism—the degree to which individuals see themselves as behaving and feeling similarly across situations. This inventory takes the form of either a 30-item (SPS-30) or 10-item (SPS-10) dichotomous response measure. Higher scores indicate greater pluralism of personality, interpreted as people behaving or feeling different in various contexts.

At first glance, this measure appears very similar to a perceived personality consistency scale. However, there are two major drawbacks to the SPS. First, the SPS

often conflates perceived consistency across a lifetime with between situations; there are double-barreled items such as "I change very little from time to time, or from one situation to another." The second is that the scale has a binary response; the scale is a True-False measure with one factor. Some researchers have criticized dichotomous response scales as less reliable than Likert-type formats. When responses yield imbalanced distributions (participants almost solely choosing True or False), Comrey (1988) notes that correlations become distorted when using a dichotomous scale. Dichotomous scales also remove nuance a continuum provides (e.g., Krosnick & Presser, 2010), which may be important for a concept like personality variability; if one often changes, participants may be less willing to select a forced-choice. As such, I predicted that a continuous response scale specifically targeting perceived consistency between situations would be a stronger predictor of creative flexibility.

3.2.2 Self-monitoring

Lennox's (1984) self-monitoring scale (SMS, Appendix M) consists of two factors—ability to modify self-presentation and sensitivity to expressive behavior of others. Like perceived personality consistency, the SMS concerns itself with individual perceiving their own changes across situations. However, the inventory relies very heavily on an individual's ideas of their own intuition and social contexts. There is also a focus on *ease* of changing: "I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and different situations." This may not reflect how often they perceive themselves to change; rather, it could be a reflection of how an individual *could* change if they *wanted* to change. Perceived personality consistency may also be reflected

outside of social contexts, such as open-mindedness and creativity. In short, these facets may not always be driven by an ability to respond to others.

I also submitted variables for consideration that may directly relate to creativity in order to compare the magnitude of associations— Self-Monitoring (Lennox, 1984, Appendix M), Need for Cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1984, Appendix N), and Theories of Intelligence (Dweck, 2000, Appendix O). These scales have a theoretical basis for an association with creativity, though no studies to my knowledge have done so directly.

3.2.3 Need for Cognition

Need for Cognition—feeling satisfaction from thinking—may imply greater creativity, as enjoying thinking may result in more solutions to a problem. Likewise, believing in the ability to increase one's intelligence may result in thinking laterally to solve problems. Research indicates that high self-monitors have preferences for information other than their own (Gangestad & Snyder, 2000; Snyder, 1974)—this may allow high self-monitors to integrate different forms of information. Therefore, it might be that high self-monitors more often think from different perspectives, which is useful in divergent thinking tasks.

3.2.4 Creative Performance

Further, I compared the PCS with a self-report scale of creative ability. Gough's Creative Performance Scale (CPS; Gough, 1979, Appendix P) was used—a seminal scale in the creativity literature. I hypothesized that the PCS would contribute variance explained above that of the CPS in its associations with actual creative ability.

Dollinger's (2003) results found it was highly correlated with Openness to Experience (r = .60) in one study comparing its performance with Creative Behavior Inventory. However, many authors have advised against generalizing this result to all measures of creativity (Feldhusen & Goh, 1995; Hocevar, 1981; Hocevar & Bachelor, 1989; Houtz & Krug, 1995). Though the CPS has not been directly compared to creative *performance*, relationships were similar enough to include in the incremental models.

3.2.5 Self-theories of Intelligence

Early theorists on intelligence have discussed fluid thought and how it was related to creative performance judgments and accuracy (e.g., Sternberg, 1985). They concluded that if people believed themselves to be able to always learn and adapt, then it made it easier to perform. This idea has been somewhat validated in modern psychological studies on creativity. First, Furnham and colleagues (2005) indicated that self-theories about creativity were related to creative performance. This was mediated by creative self-efficacy. Gong, Huang, and Farh (2009) supported this by noting that learning orientation—here, being able to continuously change and improve—was related to creativity. Similarly, the effect was mediated by creative self-efficacy. Though both relationships were modest, self-theories appeared to have some relationship to creativity. As such, I selected Dweck's (2000) scale of self-theories of intelligence as a potential competing measure for incremental validity.

3.2.6 Openness

Finally, I utilized a trait measure of openness to experience from a recent Big Five validation study (Open-mindedness: Soto & John, 2016). Furnham and Bachtiar

(2008) indicated the openness to experience has a modest significant relationship with divergent thinking tasks. I selected the Big Five Inventory II, a new, fully validated scale, including a measure of openness, in order to attain the most complete and current measures of openness to experience (BFI-II, Soto & John, 2016).

Overall, I hypothesized that PCS scores would predict flexibility scores on the alternative uses task, a measure of divergent thinking. I also predicted that the PCS would predict flexibility scores better than pre-existing measures of personality variability and self-reported creativity. Provided these predictions were accurate, it would lend support to predictive and incremental validity of the PCS.

3.3 Method

3.3.1 Participants

204 participants were recruited from an introductory psychology subject pool. One participant admitted they completed an identical task and was removed from the analysis, leaving 203 participants. The typical participant was in their late teens (M = 18.73, SD= 1.88). Participants were primarily underclassmen; there were 147 freshmen, 43 sophomores, 10 juniors, and 3 seniors. The sample had a gender disparity with 141 females and 62 males. Politically, the sample was conservative; there were 108 Republicans, 45 Democrats, 36 Independents, and 7 Libertarians (with 7 identifying as Other.) Participants often identified as Christian; 93 were Protestant, 80 were Catholic, 9 were Agnostic, 4 were Atheist, 3 were Hindu, and 3 were Islam, while 10 identified as Other.

3.3.2 Procedure

Participants were brought to a laboratory environment and were instructed to complete a Qualtrics survey about their own personality.Participants completed similar surveys to Study 1 via Qualtrics to retest the PCS' validity and replicate findings. Zero-order correlations of all variables were assessed. All scales were randomized in their appearance of the survey to prevent potential order effects. The survey included a variety of measures: the PCS (Table 1), the mini-IPIP (Donnellan et al., 2006; Appendix H); the HEXACO flexibility subscale (Lee & Ashton, 2004; Appendix C); the Meaning in Life Scale (Steger et al., 2006; Appendix D); the Authenticity Scale (Wood et al., 2008; Appendix E); and the Melbourne Decision Making Questionnaire's Indecision subscale (Mann et al., 1997; Appendix F).

Incremental Validity. New scales were also inserted into Study 2's Qualtrics survey. Forced stepwise regression models of variables theoretically analogous to the PCS were created in a method consistent with various incremental validity studies (Haynes & Lench, 2003; Lench & Chang, 2006; Kluemper et al., 2015; Ruiz et al., 2014). Initially, I separated all measures into either personality metrics or creativity metrics, with the intention to combine all measures into a final regression model. I used the Big Five Inventory II's conceptualization of open-mindedness (BFI-openness; Soto & John, 2016; Appendix L), the Self-Monitoring scale (Lennox, 1984; Appendix M), and the Self-Pluralism scale (McReynolds et al., 2000; Appendix K) as comparison measures for the initial model (personality).

Open-mindedness was measured as a Big Five variable with 12 items on a 5-point scale (1=disagree strongly; 5=agree strongly). Higher scores indicated greater intellectual curiosity, aesthetic sensitivity, and creative imagination (Soto & John, 2016). Historically, the Big Five variable of openness has been conceptualized as relating to perceptions of creativity (e.g., Feist, 1998; McCrae, 1987), though other studies implicate other traits (e.g., Feist, 1991).

The Self-Monitoring scale consisted of 13 items measured on a 7-point scale (0= Strongly disagree; 6= Strongly agree). There were two validated subscales: ability to modify self-presentation (7 items) and sensitivity to the expressive behavior of others (6 items). For the first subscale, higher scores reflected a greater willingness to change one's personality in different circumstances. For the latter, higher scores indicated a greater ability to 'read' others and intuit social cues. An example item was the following: "I have found that I can adjust my behavior to suit different people and different situations." A full listing of items can be found in Appendix L.

The Self-pluralism scale was measured on a 10-item dichotomous response inventory (1=True, -1=False), where higher scores indicated more perceived variance in personality. Final scores reflected a sum of the items, with a balanced score being zero. An example item was the following: "Sometimes I feel like two (or more) persons under the same skin." A full listing of items can be found in Appendix K. Self-Pluralism has not typically been compared to creative performance, so there is scant literature on the topic. However, self-pluralism in initial studies had a moderate relationship with self-monitoring (r = .40), and, like the PCS, it conveys the idea of a

wide-ranging personality (McReynolds et al., 2000). In this sense, those high in self-pluralism may perceive their personality as varying more and, thereby, allowing greater creative performance.

To compare the PCS to other self-report measures of creativity and intelligence, a second regression was initialized. The Creative Personality Scale (CPS; Gough, 1979), the Need for Cognition scale (Cacioppo & Petty, 1984) and Self-theories of Intelligence scale (Dweck, 2000) were utilized to see how PCS contributed over and above other measures of self-reported creativity.

The Creative Personality Scale (CPS) is an adjective check list of traits thought to be associated with creativity. The CPS was measured on a 30-item dichotomous response inventory (either checking an adjective or not), where higher scores indicated greater perceived creative self-efficacy. A full listing of adjectives is detailed in Appendix P. In Dollinger, Urban, and James' (2004) study, it was strongly correlated (*r* = .55) with Openness and particularly visual creativity, such as art. McCrae's (1987) results found the CPS was associated with divergent thinking tasks of creativity. It is a prominent scale for perceptions of creativity (Dollinger, Urban, & James, 2004), even more predictive than that of the Creative Behavior inventory (Hocevar, 1981); however, correlations appear to be modest in some cases or non-significant in others.

Need for Cognition has also been implicated as a correlate in extant creativity studies. Need for Cognition was measured using an 18-item inventory (-4= very strong disagreement, +4=very strong agreement), where higher scores indicated a greater desire to think and be challenged cognitively. An example item was the following: "I

really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems." A full listing of items can be found in Appendix N.

I included Dweck's (2000) Self-theories of Intelligence scale to directly assess if it was associated with creative performance with a self-theory scale. Self-theories of Intelligence were measured with 8 items on a 6-point scale (1=strongly disagree; 6= strongly agree.) Higher scores indicated a more concrete, rather than fluid, definition of intelligence and cognition—it is less likely to change. An example item was the following: "To be honest, you can't really change how intelligent you are." A full listing can be found in Appendix O.

Alternative Uses Task. Next, the participants engaged in the alternative uses task (e.g., Guilford, 1967)—a divergent thinking task validated as an indicator of creative potential (Runco & Acar, 2012). In a 10-minute timed task, the participants were asked to report as many creative uses as they could for an empty soda bottle (for exact instructions, see Appendix Q).

Participants' responses were later coded by three trained research assistants to assess creative performance on the task using four metrics. An individual's Fluency was the total number of responses. For each response, individuals were awarded 1 point. Three other measures of creativity were also assessed: Originality, Flexibility, and Elaboration.

Originality was scored by comparing each response to other responses from all participants. Responses that were given by 4% of participants or fewer were counted as unusual, granting 1 point. Responses that are given by less than 1% of participants

were considered unique and awarded 2 points. Fluency often influences Originality - having more responses will likely grant more originality points. To control for this contamination, Originality scores were divided by an individual's Fluency score (e.g., Hocevar, 1979; Shah et al., 2012).

Flexibility was defined as the number of categories used. For example, one individual might offer categories where a soda bottle is used as a weapon, building-block, musical instrument, and an art piece. For each category, the participant earned 1 point. However, if the participant reported two or more examples where a soda bottle was used as a weapon, they would receive no further points beyond the first.

Elaboration, defined as level of detail, was also rated by these coders. For each response, the coder rated how detailed the alternative use was. Merely defining the use earned no Elaboration points (*an art piece*). Identifying contextual information increased Elaboration by one point (*an art piece at an Urban Art Exhibit*). A highly specific response about the use also increased Elaboration by one point (*a nose on a Mickey Mouse sculpture*). Participants could receive a maximum of two points for each response, if they included both elements (*a nose on a Mickey Mouse sculpture at an Urban Art Exhibit*).

3.4 Results

3.4.1 Gender

Several independent sample t-tests assessed potential gender differences. There was no significant difference between males (M = 3.84, SD = 1.07) and females (M = 4.06, SD = 1.32) in perceived personality consistency, $t(201) = 1.28$, $p = .20$. For

creativity measures, we also found no significant difference in Fluency for males (M = 14.98, SD = 5.87) and females (M = 15.09, SD = 5.86), $t(201) = .11$, $p = .91$. Likewise, there was no significant difference between males (M = 6.95, SD = 2.03) and females (M = 6.99, SD = 2.08) in Flexibility measures, $t(201) = .13$, $p = .90$. For Originality, males (M = 2.59, SD = .58) and females (M = 2.57, SD = .55) scored about the same, $t(201) = .09$, $p = .93$. Finally, Elaboration scores were about equivalent between men (M = 1.02, SD = 1.46) and women (M = 1.23, SD = 1.46), $t(201) = .95$, $p = .35$. Overall, consistent with predictions, there were no significant effects of gender which might affect primary analyses.

3.4.2 Descriptive Statistics

A full listing of descriptive statistics and Cronbach's alphas can be found in Table 5. In short, all predictors in Study 2 met criteria for acceptable internal consistency. The Mini-IPIP scales, some of which were questionable in Study 1, were internally consistent in Study 2.

3.4.3 PCS

Similar to Study 1, PCS was internally consistent ($\alpha = .83$). Inter-item correlations for the PCS can be found in Table 6. Overall, the PCS performed well by Clark and Watson's (1995) standards, reaching an average inter-item consistency of .54. This fell slightly above the recommended range (.40 to .50) for specific constructs in scale development. Correlations between the PCS and all continuous variables are reported in Table 7. For PCS specifically, I applied a Bonferroni correction to control for family-wise error. As in Study 1, PCS scores were associated with the HEXACO

($r(201)= .32$, $p < .001$), presence of meaning ($r(201)= .30$, $p < .001$), authenticity ($r(202) = .50$, $p < .001$), and indecision ($r(201) = -.36$, $p < .001$). However, searching for meaning failed to meet this criterion, $r(201) = -.12$, $p = .08$.

Contrary to my predictions and those of Study 1, the Big Five Inventory (BFI-2) did predict PCS scores. Zero-order correlations found a positive relationship with extraversion, $r(201) = .36$, $p < .01$. As such, higher extraversion predicted greater self-perceived consistency in personality. There was also a positive relationship with conscientiousness, $r(201) = .28$, $p < .01$. Higher conscientiousness scores predicted greater perceived personality consistency. Neuroticism was negatively associated with PCS scores, $r(201) = -.38$, $p < .01$; in essence, neuroticism predicted less perceived personality consistency. Agreeableness was also positively related to PCS, $r(201) = .30$, $p < .01$, such that higher agreeableness predicted higher perceived personality consistency. Of note, Openness was unrelated to PCS scores, $r(201) = .03$, $p = .72$.

Utilizing a multiple regression with all Big Five measures as predictors and PCS as an outcome found similar results. Between the five predictors, only Extraversion ($b = .51$, $t(197) = 4.12$, $p < .01$) and Agreeableness ($b = .40$, $t(197) = 2.68$, $p < .01$) were significant by our Bonferroni correction criterion ($p < .01$). Neuroticism was marginally significant ($b = -.25$, $t(197) = -2.37$, $p = .02$). Conscientiousness ($b = .26$, $t(197) = 1.91$, $p = .06$) and Openness ($b = -.19$, $t(197) = -1.60$, $p = .11$) were non-significant.

3.4.4 Predictive Validity

Alternative Uses Task. The descriptive statistics for creativity performance are reported in Table 4. Each participant was scored on four different metrics of creativity: Fluency, Flexibility, Elaboration, and Originality. For the former three measures, three coders determined an initial score for each participant. Using the irr library in R (Gamer, Lemon, Fellows & Singh, 2012), interrater reliability was calculated by using single-score intra-class correlation (ICC). A simple *F*-test was conducted to assess whether interrater reliability was significantly different from 0. Agreement was also calculated, noting percentage-wise how often coders' scores fell within 1 point of each other. For Fluency, initial scoring was highly reliable with an ICC of .97, $F(202, 62.4) = 109.00$, $p < .001$. All three coders were within 1 point of each other for about 74% of participants. For ideas in which two or more coders believed the alternative use did not follow directions (either by being non-sensical or being a standard use), that idea was removed from future analyses. 201 ideas were removed (about 6%), leaving 3,004 ideas in total across 203 participants.

For Flexibility, initial scoring was highly reliable with an ICC of .80, $F(202,363) = 13.30$, $p < .001$. The coders were within 1 point of each other for about 59% of participants. For Elaboration, initial scoring was fairly reliable with an ICC of .59, $F(202, 62.4) = 109.00$, $p < .001$. All three coders were within 1 point of each other for about 76% of participants. These metrics indicated good to excellent interrater reliability as per Cicchetti's (1994) standards. Next, coders met to reach consensus on

any participants in which they disagreed—scores were updated, resulting in one score for each creativity metric.

Originality was calculated differently. It was measured by frequency; conceptually identical uses were grouped by a single trained research assistant. For example, "noisemaker" was grouped with "maracas," "morrocas [sic]," and "if filled up with tiny pebbles could be morrocos a musical intrument [sic]", among others, as all make noise upon shaking them. These groupings differ strictly from Flexibility categories in that they are conceptually *identical*, not just similar. Participant information was removed and alternative uses randomized, so the research assistant was not influenced by order. The research assistant's work resulted in 44 different categories, which are fully detailed in Table 8. Within these 44 categories, there were 3,004 ideas in total. For each alternative use, participants received one point for the idea if its category fell below 120 mentions for all participants (about 4% of ideas). If their idea was in a category below 32 mentions (about 1%), participants received two points for the idea. Summing the points received for each idea and dividing them by the individual's Fluency score resulted in a participant's Originality score.

After coding, results indicated the typical participant offered about 15 valid alternative uses in 10 minutes, though scores varied widely (M = 15.05, SD = 5.85). In general, each participant gave solutions from 7 different categories (M = 6.98, SD = 2.06). Participants received about 5 points on average for original responses with a large spread (M = 4.97, SD = 2.71)—controlling for Fluency diminished these scores

considerably (M = .33, SD = .18). Elaboration was positively skewed, such that many participants scored low with outliers influencing the distribution (M = 1.17, SD = 1.51).

Correlation analyses were conducted between PCS measures and the four creativity facets post-consensus: Fluency, Originality, Flexibility, and Elaboration. Consistent with predictions, Flexibility was associated with PCS, $r(201) = -.21$, $p < .001$, such that as perceived personality consistency scores decreased, Flexibility performance on the task increased. PCS was unassociated with Fluency, $r(201) = .01$, $p = .99$, Originality, $r(201) = .05$, $p = .48$, and Elaboration, $r(201) = .11$, $p = .11$. As such, for incremental validity of the PCS, we focused on Flexibility as an outcome measure. In sum, this partially supported my initial hypothesis that the PCS predicted creative performance, but especially Flexibility. However, the PCS did not predict Originality scores.

3.4.5 Incremental Validity

Next, I examined the incremental validity of the PCS, in predicting above other conceptually related variables. Table 7 contains a correlation matrix with all predictors.

Creativity. Overall, typical measures of creativity did not seem to correlate well with Flexibility. The CPS was unassociated with Flexibility, $r(201) = .07$, $p = .32$. Need for Cognition, similarly, was unrelated, $r(201) = .10$, $p = .15$. Self-theories of intelligence also appeared unrelated to Flexibility, though it bordered on marginal, $r(201) = .11$, $p = .12$. Since they did not relate to the outcome measures, these variables were discarded from final models.

Personality. Self-pluralism was significantly correlated with Flexibility scores, $r(201) = .16$, $p < .01$. Neither ability to adapt presentation ($r(201) = .06$, $p = .40$) nor sensitivity to the expressive behavior of others ($r(201) = -.07$, $p = .32$) were associated with Flexibility performance. Interestingly, the Big Five Inventory's open-mindedness metric ($r(201) = .18$, $p < .01$), but not the mini-IPIP's Intellect score ($r(201) = .06$, $p = .40$), was associated with Flexibility. Overall, since self-pluralism and BFI-openness were positively related to Flexibility performance, I included them with PCS in incremental validity models.

Full model. In order to measure the impact of PCS on Flexibility, forced stepwise linear models were created (for a step-by-step approach: Haynes & Lench, 2003). Results from these models and the change in variance explained are reported in Table 9. The initial model included both BFI-openness scores and self-pluralism as predictors. The second added the PCS. The first model was overall significant, $F(2, 200) = 6.11$, $p < .001$, with both BFI-openness ($b = .54$, $t(200) = 2.55$, $p = .01$) and self-pluralism ($b = .61$, $t(200) = 2.38$, $p = .02$) positively predicted Flexibility, controlling for each other. The percentage of variance explained (R^2) by the model was about 6%.

Similarly, the full model with all three predictors was significant, $F(3, 199) = 5.70$, $p < .001$. BFI-openness significantly predicted Flexibility ($b = .56$, $t(199) = 2.66$, $p < .01$), controlling for the other two variables. The PCS also significantly predicted Flexibility ($b = -.34$, $t(199) = -2.16$, $p < .05$), controlling for the other two variables. However, self-pluralism became a non-significant factor ($b = .08$, $t(199) = .22$, $p = .82$),

partialling out effects of the other variables. The percentage of variance explained (R^2) by the model was about 8%.

Analysis of R^2 –change assessed whether the models were significantly different from each other in predictivity. The change in variance explained between the two models was significantly different, $\Delta R = .04$, $F(1, 199) = 4.66$, $p < .05$. The full model ($R^2 = .08$) explained significantly more variance than the initial model ($R^2 = .06$). This also suggested that PCS, as well as openness to experience, contributed to the prediction of Flexibility performance, despite controlling for other existing significant predictors.

In sum, this evidence supported initial hypotheses that the PCS could predict creative performance above that of pre-existing measures.

3.5 Discussion

Study 2 contributed to several key objectives. First, it replicated and solidified several findings of Study 1, strengthening construct validity. Perceived personality consistency again correlated with presence of meaning in life (+), authenticity (+), and indecision (-). Though the relationship with searching for meaning in life did not replicate, it was marginally significant. Second, Study 2 supported predictive validity, creating a link between the PCS and creative performance. Specifically, Flexibility, a process measure of creativity, correlated with performance on a prominent divergent thinking task. Third, Study 2 addressed incremental validity concerns. It contributed above that of the Self-Pluralism scale and in conjunction with the Big Five measure of openness to experience to predict Flexibility scores. This provides evidence that while perceived personality consistency is functionally distinct from openness, it overlaps and

outperforms the Self-Pluralism scale on creativity flexibility. The PCS explains more variance in half the number of items, suggesting the measure is incrementally valid.

4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The goal of the present investigation was to develop a scale to measure perceived personality consistency. These two studies, taken together, (1) resulted in development of an individual difference measure of perceived personality consistency, assessing the psychometric properties of the measure, (2) explored the association between perceived personality consistency and creative performance, and (3) assessed how the new personality consistency measure compares to extant measures. Study 1 involved initial scale development of perceived personality consistency *between contexts*. The five-item measure was internally consistent via factor analysis and Cronbach's alpha. As expected, the construct had considerable convergent and divergent validity-- authenticity, meaning in life, and indecision were associated with this variable, while personality traits were not strongly tied to it. Study 2 replicated many of these findings and added a creative performance task; perceived personality consistency negatively correlated with Flexibility creativity performance scores—those with greater perceived consistency often reported fewer idea categories. This supported the predictive validity of the PCS. Finally, the PCS appeared to be incrementally valid as a predictor of Flexibility. In conjunction with the openness to experience personality variable, it contributed to variance accounted for above that attributed to Self-pluralism or other measures of personality variability. Despite having fewer items than the Self-Pluralism scale, the PCS performed better.

4.1 The PCS and Flexibility

The PCS appears only to be a predictor of Flexibility scores on the alternative uses task. It did not significantly associate with Fluency, Originality, or Elaboration in Study 2. Initial hypotheses supported only modest effects for creativity, but the findings suggest no relation. However, these results make sense, considering how these creativity metrics are conceptualized. Flexibility is often considered a variable assessing the creative process: a measure of how broadly the design space—here, a cognitive landscape of potentially effective ideas—has been explored for a solution (e.g., Shah, Millsap, Woodward, & Smith, 2012). While Fluency may reflect a large amount of ideas with superficial deviations, Flexibility reflects greater conceptual variation in solutions. In essence, to begin solving a problem, individuals generate ideas from different perspectives. While Fluency and Flexibility are often highly correlated, as they were in this study (r = .65), they often show how differently certain individuals approach their problem-solving.

Like Flexibility, low perceived personality consistency may also reflect variation—individuals potentially visualize themselves as different individuals under different circumstances. A similar association was seen between Flexibility and the Self-Pluralism scale, where higher scores indicated greater variety of self-perspectives (McReynolds et al., 2000). However, partialling out the variance of the PCS completely eliminated this effect, suggesting that the PCS is a stronger version of a similar construct. The PCS does not, however, eliminate the effect of the BFI-2's open-

mindedness trait, suggesting that perceived personality consistency is functionally distinct from openness.

4.2 Remaining Questions

There were limitations to the study. First, personality relationships were inconsistent between Study 1 and Study 2. The overall pattern changed from barely any significant predictors for PCS to modest relationships with Extraversion and Agreeableness. One explanation could be because of sampling bias or participant quality. Study 1 participants were collected at the end of a semester, just as people are rushed to earn course credit, while Study 2 was collected at the beginning. Measures of internal consistency were typically lower in quality, and the distributions varied less in Study 1. However, central tendencies of personality also may be inconsistently associated with personality variability. This may be complicated by perceived personality consistency's relationship with divergent thinking tasks; even different scales measuring the same Big Five variables (i.e., BBF: Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003; NEO: Costa & McCrae, 1992; IPIP: Goldberg et al., 2006) have differed with respect to reaching significance *within the same divergent thinking task sample* (Silvia et al., 2008).

Secondly, the PCS did not correlate with all measures of creativity, but this may be due to the structure of the task rather than a lack of association. This alternative uses task lasted ten minutes; this may have been too much time. It is impossible to tell the speed to which each person reported ideas with the current data—perhaps Fluency and Originality would be better associated given a more stringent time limit. A sprint

approach, rather than a marathon, might be useful here. This method would benefit participants who could quickly generate a substantial quantity of ideas or reward those whom gave very novel ideas in a short period. Elaboration may have also been harmed by the nature of a timed task. Though most of the other measures were normally distributed, Elaboration was skewed right, exhibiting a floor effect. Despite not framing the task as a competition, participants may have felt compelled to report a short solution then move on without wasting time. Future studies should tease these issues out by modifying time limit—either by limiting it or removing it.

Finally, the incremental models contained very few significant variables, despite predictions that many scales were conceptually related. Specifically, the Creative Personality, Need for Cognition, and Self-Monitoring were not related to Flexibility scores on the alternative uses task. Some of my results starkly contrast the literature; for example, in the original Self-Pluralism validation study (McReynolds et al., 2000), self-pluralism moderately correlated with self-monitoring (r = .41). In this study, self-pluralism was completely uncorrelated with either self-monitoring subscale. This seemed to spread to Flexibility measures. The Need for Cognition scale has been moderately related (about r = .35) to performance on creative inventories and tasks (e.g., Dollinger, 2003; Hocevar, 1981); however, a similar study with the Rational-Experiential Inventory's (REI: Pacini & Epstein, 1999) rational thinking subscale, an adapted Need for Cognition scale, was non-significant on the four metrics.

Though not all effects were this dramatic, I observed attenuation of predictors' effects in the current work, relative to published studies. McCrae (1987) reported a

strong relationship between the CPS and Openness to Experience (r = .44). Dollinger, Urban, and James (2004) reported a similarly strong effect decades later (r = .55). However, my study found only a moderate association between the two variables (BFI-2: r = .38; Mini-IPIP: r = .28). For specifically creativity, McCrae (1987) found that CPS was significantly related to several different divergent thinking tasks, but most effects were modest (typically around r = .20). If this pattern of weakening can be extrapolated, it might explain the current study's non-significance. One explanation for these smaller effects relative to other studies might be political affiliation. Dollinger (2007) noted that conservatism had a small but consistent negative relationship with creativity metrics, even controlling for verbal ability and openness to experience; since both samples were overwhelmingly Republican and consisted typically of Texas residents, this may have made relationships more diffuse. Unfortunately, I did not include a validated scale of conservatism to verify.

4.3 Conclusion

Despite these limitations, this study package provided further evidence of an association between beliefs (perceived personality consistency) and reality (creative ability). Past research has found some evidence that beliefs in one's own creativity often correlates with performance (Furnham, Zhang, & Chamorro-Premuzic, 2006; Gong, Huang, & Farh, 2009). This connection creates avenues for experimental work. Prior research has manipulated perceptions of the self via meta-cognitive accessibility in order to produce real changes in performance (e.g., Corby & Hama, 2011; Schwarz, 1998; Schwarz et al., 1991). Future research could explore 'fooling' individuals into

thinking they are more variable in personality—thereby, augmenting creative performance by changing their responses on the PCS.

This approach is reminiscent of the growth mindset literature, where students are informed that intelligence is either fixed or able to grow; experimenters here manipulate beliefs, which produce real-world results. For example, several studies have used this growth-mindset manipulation to improve mathematical performance (e.g., Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2007). Though it is only a belief, this mindset appears to impact neural effects on cognitive control (Schroder, Moran, Donnellan, & Moser, 2014). Applied to the PCS, this experimental manipulation might prove useful for education; if researchers can influence students' self-perceptions to help them become more creative, teachers may be able to utilize or adapt tasks for their own curriculum. Practical applications could involve students exploring different approaches to idea generation or helping students with thinking from others' (different) perspectives—a new form of diversity training.

It is worth noting one consistent pattern of results between Study 1 and 2. Low PCS scores were associated with less authenticity, potentially more neuroticism, and less presence of meaning in life. Overall, having a greater perceived consistency in personality appeared to predict greater stability; however, this does not mean that having a diffuse sense of personality is a wholly negative experience. In some circumstances, low perceived personality consistency can be functional—the current investigation has suggested creative flexibility may improve. Despite a greater surety in a sense a self, a person believing themselves to be rigidly consistent personality may not

always benefit. If they are unwilling or unable to change, their own beliefs may hinder them when the situation demands flexibility. Therefore, if this construct can be manipulated, it will be important to determine *when* belief in personality consistency is adaptive or not.

The current findings constitute a next step in personality research. Though researchers have explored personality as a predictor of creativity, they have often focused on Big Five measures. Creativity researchers have suggested significant associations with several Big Five variables, but directions of effects have often been inconsistent. For example, specifically in divergent thinking task performance, neuroticism has ranged between r = -.14 and r = .14, with some replications finding non-significant results (Kaufman et al., 2015; Lin et al., 2013; McCrae, 1987; Pickering, Smillie, & DeYoung, 2016; Silvia et al., 2009). In response to these conflicting findings, researchers have taken issue with any single inventory predicting creativity performance or suggested continual replication (e.g., Dollinger, 2003; Feldhusen & Goh, 1995; Hocevar, 1981; Hocevar & Bachelor, 1989; Houtz & Krug, 1995). The current findings reflected that the only consistently significant personality factor associated with creative performance was openness to experience; even then, effects were typically modest. The current investigation suggests that a new factor should be considered in conjunction with this measure: perceived personality consistency. Though the PCS explained variance above that of existing personality variability scales, it was unrelated to openness to experience. It appears both factors are useful to predict creative flexibility.

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APPENDIX A

TABLES

Table 1.
The Personality Consistency Scale (PCS) Items (Study 1)

Item	Factor	Item-total *r*
1. I feel like my personality changes from situation to situation.*	0.85	0.72
2. In different situations, I am a very different person.*	0.80	0.63
3. In a social setting, I behave very differently than I actually am.*	0.78	0.61
4. How I behave depends on who I am around.*	0.71	0.51
5. I try on personality traits like someone might try on clothes: a trait for each occasion.*	0.62	0.42

Note. Items with a star (*) indicated a reverse scored item. The item-total *r* column assesses the individual item's correlation with all other items.

Table 2.

Descriptive Statistics of All Scales for Validation (Study 1)

Scale	*M*	*SD*	*α*
Attitude Consistency Items	4.25	0.84	0.72
Authenticity Scale	4.90	0.96	0.87
HEXACO - Flexibility Subscale	3.95	1.02	0.86
MDMQ - Indecision Subscale	3.98	1.41	0.89
Meaning in Life - Presence Subscale	4.67	1.31	0.89
Meaning in Life - Searching Subscale	4.29	1.32	0.91
Mini-IPIP: Agreeableness	5.02	1.15	0.74
Mini-IPIP: Conscientiousness	4.32	1.16	0.70
Mini-IPIP: Extraversion	4.20	1.44	0.79
Mini-IPIP: Intellect	4.92	1.06	0.65
Mini-IPIP: Neuroticism	3.60	1.02	0.56
PCS	4.43	1.16	0.82

Note. Most scales utilized in Study 1 performed well, with the exceptions of the Mini-IPIP's Neuroticism and Intellect subscales. As this is a shortened scale, future research should examine the full IPIP to offer a more consistent responses of personality traits.

Table 3.

Inter-Item Correlations for PCS (Study 1)

Item.	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
In different situations, I am a very different person.	1.00				
In a social setting, I behave very differently…	.45**	1.00			
I feel like my personality changes from situation…	.53**	.50**	1.00		
How I behave depends on who I am around.	.42**	.34**	.48**	1.00	
I try on personality traits like someone…	.28**	.39**	.42**	.24*	1.00

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$. Items fully listed in Table 1. Average inter-item correlation is .41.

Table 4.

Correlation Matrix (Study 1)

Scale	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1. PCS	(.82)											
2. Attitude Consistency	0.31*	(.72)										
3. Indecision	-0.28*	-0.36*	(.89)									
4. Authenticity	0.48*	0.49*	-0.31*	(.87)								
5. HEXACO Flexibility	-0.23*	0.03	0.16	-0.24*	(.86)							
6. MILQ Presence	0.27*	0.26*	-0.30*	0.41*	-0.14	(.89)						
7. MILQ Searching	-0.27*	-0.19$^{\varepsilon}$	0.22*	-0.30*	0.13	-0.33*	(.91)					
8. Intellect	0.13	0.05	-0.03	0.16	-0.12	0.17	-0.02	(.65)				
9. Conscientiousness	0.05	0.20$^{\varepsilon}$	-0.46*	0.29*	-0.03	0.24*	-0.10	-0.01	(.70)			
10. Extraversion	0.16	0.09	-0.23*	0.12	0.00	0.20	-0.06	0.11	0.04	(.79)		
11. Agreeableness	0.10	0.10	-0.01	0.22*	-0.24*	0.06	0.14	0.12	0.15	0.13	(.74)	
12. Neuroticism	-0.30*	-0.24*	0.29*	-0.38*	0.31*	-0.24*	0.28*	-0.21*	-0.26*	-0.15	-0.02	(.56)

Note. Cronbach's alphas for scales are in parentheses.

$^{\varepsilon}$ $p < .10$.

* $p < .05$.

MILQ = Meaning in Life Questionnaire.

Table 5.
Descriptive Statistics and Cronbach's alpha for scales (Study 2)

Scale	*M*	*SD*	α
Authenticity Scale	5.17	.99	0.87
BFI Agreeableness	3.81	.58	0.78
BFI Conscientious	3.70	.63	0.83
BFI Extraversion	3.55	.68	0.84
BFI Neuroticism	2.79	.85	0.89
BFI Openness	3.56	.67	0.83
Decisional Procrastination	3.67	1.37	0.85
HEXACO Flexibility	4.12	.99	0.81
Meaning in Life Presence	4.86	1.45	0.90
Meaning in Life Searching	4.54	1.59	0.90
Mini-IPIP Agreeableness	5.63	1.03	0.77
Mini-IPIP Conscientiousness	4.78	1.24	0.75
Mini-IPIP Extraversion	4.32	1.49	0.85
Mini-IPIP Neuroticism	3.65	1.29	0.71
Mini-IPIP Openness to Experience	4.50	.84	0.78
Need for Cognition	5.39	1.22	0.90
Personality Consistency Scale	4.00	1.25	0.86
Self Monitoring - Modify Self-Presentation	4.98	.95	0.79
Self Monitoring –Expressive Behavior	5.07	1.06	0.80
Self Pluralism Scale	-.35	.55	0.81
Self-theories of Intelligence	2.73	.83	0.77
Fluency – Number of Ideas	15.05	5.85	-
Flexibility – Number of Categories	6.98	2.06	-
Originality – Novelty per Idea	.33	.18	-
Elaboration – Detail of Ideas	1.17	1.51	-

Note. BFI: Big Five Inventory. For alpha, scores above .70 are considered good, above .80 is considered to be great, and above .90 is considered to be excellent (DeVellis, 2012).

Table 6.

Inter-Item Correlations for PCS (Study 2)

Item.	1	2	3	4	5
In different situations, I am…	1				
In a social setting, I behave...	.57**	1			
I feel like my personality changes from…	.71**	.64**	1		
How I behave depends…	.57**	.48**	.52**	1	
I try on personality traits like someone…	.42**	.55**	.56**	.44**	1

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$. Items fully listed in Table 1. Average inter-item correlation is .54.

Table 7.

Correlation Matrix, Study 2

Scale	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
1. PCS	0.32**	-0.12	0.30**	0.50**	-0.36**	-0.70**	0.09	-0.05	0.09	0.32**	0.19*	0.01
2. HEXACO		-0.25**	0.30**	0.28**	-0.33**	-0.32**	0.11	-0.05	0.05	0.1	0.16*	0.02
3. MIL_S			-0.29**	-0.21**	0.23**	0.12	0.02	-0.08	-0.05	-0.06	-0.07	0.21**
4. MIL_P				0.56**	-0.28**	-0.40**	0.11	-0.02	0.28**	0.25**	0.23**	-0.03
5. Authenticity					-0.50**	-0.52**	0.27**	-0.20**	0.27**	0.24**	0.28**	0.02
6. DP						0.33**	-0.34**	0.07	-0.17*	-0.04	-0.36**	-0.08
7. SPS							-0.06	0.22**	-0.19**	-0.27**	-0.27**	0.11
8. NFC								-0.04	0.25**	0.01	0.1	0.37**
9. STInt									0.1	0.02	-0.01	0.12
10. CPS										0.39**	-0.05	0.28**
11. MI_E											-0.05	0.11
12. MI_C												0.02
13. MI_I												
14. MI_N												
15. MI_A												
16. BFI_E												
17. BFI_C												
18. BFI_O												
19. BFI_N												
20. BFI_A												
21. SMS_SP												
22. SMS_XB												
23. Fluency												
24. Flexibility												
25. Elaboration												
26. Originality												

Table 7 Continued.

Scale	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26
1. PCS	-0.32**	0.26**	0.36**	0.28**	0.03	-0.37**	0.30**	-0.07	0.08	0.00	-0.21**	0.11	0.05
2. HEXACO	-0.45**	0.30**	0.11	0.19**	0.20**	-0.49**	0.58**	0.05	-0.08	-0.01	0.05	-0.01	0.09
3. MIL_S	0.21**	0.05	-0.19**	-0.14*	0.07	0.26**	-0.10	0.02	0.17	0.02	-0.08	-0.1	-0.03
4. MIL_P	-0.38**	0.15*	0.42**	0.33**	0.11	-0.51**	0.32**	0.23**	0.13	-0.07	-0.12	0.00	-0.07
5. Authenticity	-0.47**	0.08	0.47**	0.44**	0.18*	-0.60**	0.25**	0.09	0.12	-0.06	-0.17*	0.05	-0.03
6. DP	0.29**	-0.11	-0.21**	-0.48**	-0.22**	0.38**	-0.15*	-0.12	-0.11	-0.04	-0.01	-0.11	-0.02
7. SPS	0.47**	-0.09	-0.33**	-0.35**	0.01	0.52**	-0.36**	0.01	0.01	0.07	0.16*	-0.04	0.05
8. NFC	-0.07	0.09	0.13	0.21**	0.59**	-0.16*	0.11	0.07	0.17*	0.14*	0.10	0.14*	-0.11
9. STInt	0.12	-0.10	-0.01	-0.01	0.05	0.13	-0.18*	0.07	-0.02	0.11	0.11	0.03	0.11
10. CPS	-0.19**	-0.10	0.45**	0.06	0.38**	-0.29**	-0.06	0.18*	0.14*	0.11	0.07	0.08	-0.06
11. MI_E	-0.18*	0.17*	0.73**	-0.03	0.16*	-0.23**	0.07	0.28**	0.16*	0.04	-0.04	0.10	0.04
12. MI_C	-0.21**	0.12	0.02	0.76**	0.01	-0.20**	0.24**	0.08	0.02	-0.13	-0.15*	0.02	-0.04
13. MI_O	0.11	0.10	0.07	-0.06	0.58**	0.09	-0.01	0.05	0.11	0.17	0.06	0.00	-0.04
14. MI_N		0.01	-0.27**	-0.29**	-0.08	0.82**	-0.36**	-0.05	-0.01	0.04	-0.05	-0.05	-0.02
15. MI_A			0.15*	0.19**	0.15*	0.05	0.49**	0.05	0.27**	0.04	-0.03	0.08	-0.07
16. BFI_E				0.13	0.23**	-0.36**	0.13	0.30**	0.24**	0.01	-0.06	0.12	0.01
17. BFI_C					0.07	-0.34**	0.34**	0.09	0.15*	-0.1	-0.12	0.03	0.00
18. BFI_O						-0.13	0.19**	0.16*	0.23**	0.29**	0.18*	0.15*	-0.06
19. BFI_N							-0.35**	-0.13*	0.00	0.03	-0.01	-0.03	-0.02
20. BFI_A								0.02	0.00	-0.07	-0.01	-0.11	-0.02
21. SMS_SP									0.44**	0.07	0.06	0.14*	0.04
22. SMS_XB										0.08	-0.07	0.18*	-0.04
23. Fluency											0.65**	0.18*	0.12
24. Flexibility												0.06	0.20**
25. Elaboration													0.21**
26. Originality													

Note: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$. PCS = Personality Consistency Scale; MIL = Meaning in Life (searching and presence); DP = Decisional Procrastination Scale; SPS = Self Pluralism Scale; NFC = Need for Cognition; STInt = Self-theories of Intelligence; CPS = Creative Personality Scale; MI = Mini-IPIP (extraversion, conscientiousness, intelligence, neuroticism, agreeableness); BFI = Big Five Inventory (extraversion, conscientiousness, openness, neuroticism, agreeableness); SMS = Self-monitoring (ability to modify self-presentation, sensitivity to expressive behavior of others).

Table 8.
Creativity Task Norms (Study 2)

Category	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Awarded	Examples
Container	571	19.01%	19.01%	0	A bottle that contains things, like coins or shampoo
Plant and Animal Houses	283	9.42%	28.43%	0	A bottle made into a terrarium or home for insects
Instrument or Noisemaker	253	8.42%	36.85%	0	A percussion, woodwind, or rhythmic instrument
Sports or Games	240	7.99%	44.84%	0	Used for games like football or soccer
Crafts	186	6.19%	51.03%	0	Modified into something different like jewelry
Artwork or decoration	185	6.16%	57.19%	0	As part of an art exhibit or integrated into similar artistic works
Toy	176	5.86%	63.05%	0	Toys for children, like a pretend gun or a spaceship
Weapon	156	5.19%	68.24%	0	The primary use is to harm, injure, or break something
Tool	129	4.29%	72.54%	0	Helps the person perform a task: hammer, shovel, or a blade
Weight	106	3.53%	76.07%	1	Used as a paperweight, door prop
Science	104	3.46%	79.53%	1	Utilized in science, like a flask
Waste Disposal	81	2.70%	82.22%	1	Used to dispose of human waste or trash
Communication	66	2.20%	84.42%	1	Sending a message, either written or spoken.
Floatation	55	1.83%	86.25%	1	Used to buoy, like for a boat or fishing bob
Chew Toy	51	1.70%	87.95%	1	Used as a chew toy for a pet
Target	49	1.63%	89.58%	1	Used as targets for firearm or throwing practice
Sprinkler or Filter	43	1.43%	91.01%	1	Used to filter water or another liquid through by punching holes
Cooking	39	1.30%	92.31%	1	Used as cooking implements like a rolling pin or cookie cutter
Dishware	33	1.10%	93.41%	1	Converting the bottle into a cup or dish
Pretend Prop	33	1.10%	94.51%	1	Used in theater productions or assisting in hypotheticals
Lighting	31	1.03%	95.54%	2	Lanterns and flashlights
Speaker	25	0.83%	96.37%	2	Megaphones or microphones
Lava Lamp	14	0.47%	96.84%	2	Creating a functioning lava lamp
Lense or Magnifying Glass	14	0.47%	97.30%	2	Magnification, distortion, or coloring a view
Wheels	10	0.33%	97.64%	2	Used as wheels for stockcars or other creations

Table 8 Continued.

Category	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative	Awarded	Examples
Timer	9	0.30%	97.94%	2	Putting sand in it could create an hourglass
Firestarter	9	0.30%	98.24%	2	Using it for survival and fire creation in the wild
Trap	8	0.27%	98.50%	2	Using it to trap animals or insects with bait
Prank or Scare	8	0.27%	98.77%	2	Coopted into a trap designed to embarrass someone
Suction Cup	7	0.23%	99.00%	2	Used to create some means of suction; separating egg yolks
Smoking	4	0.13%	99.13%	2	Converting the bottle into drug paraphernalia
Alarm	4	0.13%	99.27%	2	Used as a makeshift security system (knocking over, trip wires)
Squeezer	3	0.10%	99.37%	2	Slight adjustments can allow it to squeeze things like ketchup
Shoe Shaper	3	0.10%	99.47%	2	Bottle can be inserted to prevent shoes from flattening
Time Capsule	3	0.10%	99.57%	2	Contains important memories to be shared at a later date
Emergency	2	0.07%	99.63%	2	Traffic cones for road or when a car breaks down
Cheating	2	0.07%	99.70%	2	Used to cheat on an exam as an innocuous object
Sundial	2	0.07%	99.77%	2	Used as a pointer in a sundial in order to tell the real time
Educational Product	2	0.07%	99.83%	2	Helping students learn or as a topic of a psychology study
Shades	1	0.03%	99.87%	2	Using the label in order to shield or dim light on one's eyes
Lifting	1	0.03%	99.90%	2	Placing it on its side and allowing it to roll or as a fulcrum
Impact Reducer	1	0.03%	99.93%	2	Used to blunt the force of trauma, as shock absorbers might
Trophy	1	0.03%	99.97%	2	Converted into an award of some sort for a competition
Sex toy	1	0.03%	100.00%	2	Utilized sexually or as part of an adult fantasy

Note. There were 3,004 ideas in sum between 44 different categories judged by research assistants. Frequency indicated how often an idea of a particular category occurred. Lines separated points awarded (0, 1, or 2).

Table 9.
Results for Incremental Validity Analysis

	B	*SE*	*β*	*t*	*p*	R^2
Flexibility (initial)						.06**
Openness	.54	.21	.18	2.55*	<.01	
Self-pluralism	.61	.26	.16	2.37*	.01	
Flexibility (full)						.08**
Openness	.56	.21	.18	2.66**	<.01	
Self-pluralism	.08	.36	.02	.22	.83	
PCS	-.34	.16	-.20	-2.16*	.03	

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$.
The change in variance explained between the two models was significantly different, $\Delta R = .04$, $F(1, 199) = 4.66$, $p < .05$.

APPENDIX B

FIRST DRAFT OF THE PERSONALITY CONSISTENCY SCALE

Instructions: The following survey will ask you about your personality under different circumstances. People may vary in consistency across situations and across time. For each item below, indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statement regarding your own personality.

---

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Strongly Disagree **Strongly Agree**

General Traits - Consistency across Short Term

1. Over the past year, my personality has not changed much.
2. Over the past year, my personality has changed significantly.*
3. About a year ago, I held the same beliefs I have now.
4. About a year ago, I behaved the same way that I do now.
5. About a year ago, I thought similarly to how I do now.
6. My personality has been the same all my life.

General Traits - Belief in Personality Resilience

1. My personality is very fluid.*
2. When I need to change who I am to fit the situation, it takes a lot of effort for me to do so.
3. I am comfortable acting differently than how I actually am.*
4. I'm always myself regardless of who I am around.
5. When I need to change who I am to fit the situation, it takes little effort.*
6. It is difficult for me to act in a way inconsistent with my personality.

General Traits - Consistency between Contexts

1. In different situations, I am a very different person.*
2. In a social setting, I behave very differently than I actually am.*
3. I feel like my personality changes from situation to situation.*
4. When I am outside my comfort zone, I adapt quickly without much effort.*

5. How I behave depends on who I am around.*
6. When I am outside my comfort zone, I do not change how I act at all.
7. I try on personality traits like someone might try on clothes: a trait for each occasion.*

Specific Traits – Consistency across Lifetime

1. Across my lifetime, I have always been as reserved or outgoing as I am today.
2. Across my lifetime, I have always been as social or non-social as I am today.
3. Across my lifetime, I have always been as careful or unconcerned as I am today
4. Across my lifetime, I have always been as hardworking or lazy as I am today
5. Across my lifetime, I have always been as friendly or unfriendly as I am today.
6. Across my lifetime, I have always been as polite or blunt as I am today.
7. Across my lifetime, I have always been as unstable or stable as I am today.
8. Across my lifetime, I have always been as anxious or calm as I am today.
9. Across my lifetime, I have always been as creative or uncreative as I am today.
10. Across my lifetime, I have always been as open to new experiences or closed to new experiences as I am today.

Note. *reverse scored

APPENDIX C

HEXACO- FLEXIBILITY SUBSCALE (LEE & ASHTON, 2004)

---

1 2 3 4 5

Strongly Disagree **Strongly Agree**

---

1. I adjust easily.
2. I am good at taking advice.
3. When interacting with a group of people, I am often bothered by at least one of them.*
4. I react strongly to criticism.*
5. I get upset if others change the way I have arranged things.*
6. I am hard to convince.*
7. I am annoyed by others' mistakes.*
8. I can't stand being contradicted.*
9. I am hard to satisfy.*
10. I am hard to reason with.*

Note. *reverse scored

APPENDIX D

MEANING IN LIFE SCALE (STEGER ET AL., 2006)

Directions: Please take a moment to think about what makes your life and existence feel important and significant to you. Please respond to the following statements as truthfully and accurately as you can, and also please remember that these are very subjective questions and that there are no right or wrong answers.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Absolutely Untrue **Absolutely True**

1. I understand my life's meaning.^
2. I am looking for something that makes my life feel meaningful.$^{+}$
3. I am always looking to find my life's purpose.$^{+}$
4. My life has a clear sense of purpose.^
5. I have a good sense of what makes my life meaningful.^
6. I have discovered a satisfying life purpose.$^{+}$
7. I am always searching for something that makes my life feel significant.^
8. I am seeking a purpose or mission for my life.^
9. My life has no clear purpose.*$^{+}$
10. I am searching for meaning in my life. ^

Note. * reverse scored
$^{+}$ Presence of Meaning subscale
^ Searching for Meaning subscale.

APPENDIX E

AUTHENTICITY SCALE (WOOD ET AL., 2008)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Does not describe me at all						**Describes me very well**

1. I think it is better to be yourself than to be popular.
2. I don't know how I really feel inside.*
3. I am strongly influenced by the opinions of others.*
4. I usually do what other people tell me to do.*
5. I always feel I need to do what others expect me to do.*
6. Other people influence me greatly.*
7. I feel as if I don't know myself very well.*
8. I always stand by what I believe in.
9. I am true to myself in most situations.
10. I feel out of touch with the 'real me.'*
11. I live in accordance with my values and beliefs.
12. I feel alienated from myself.*

Note. *reverse scored

APPENDIX F

MELBOURNE DECISION MAKING QUESTIONNAIRE (MANN ET AL., 1997) – INDECISION SUBSCALE

---

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Strongly Disagree **Strongly Agree**

---

1. I waste a lot of time on trivial matters before getting to the final decision.
2. Even after I have made a decision, I delay acting upon it.
3. When I have to make a decision, I wait for a long time before starting to think about it.
4. I delay making decisions until it is too late.
5. I put off making decisions.

APPENDIX G

ATTITUDE CONSISTENCY ITEMS

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree						**Strongly Agree**

1. Others' opinions often make me change my stance on an issue.*
2. I often change what side I support on an issue depending on the context.*
3. When viewing an argument, I can be convinced by either side. *
4. I do not often change my mind.
5. I am not likely to change my stance on an issue I care about.
6. Small details can change my decisions on an issue.*
7. How I react to a similar situations depends on the details.*
8. Very little changes what I believe.

Note. * reverse scored. The Cronbach's alpha for Study 1 was .72.

APPENDIX H

MINI-IPIP (DONNELLAN ET AL., 2006)

Instructions: On the following pages, there are phrases describing people's behaviors. Please use the rating scale below to describe how accurately each statement describes you. Describe yourself as you generally are now, not as you wish to be in the future. Describe yourself as you honestly see yourself, in relation to other people you know of the same sex as you are, and roughly your same age. So that you can describe yourself in an honest manner, your responses will be kept in absolute confidence. Please read each statement carefully, and then fill in the bubble that corresponds to the number on the scale.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Very Inaccurate **Very accurate**

1. Am the life of the party (E)
2. Sympathize with others' feelings (A)
3. Get chores done right away (C)
4. Have frequent mood swings (N)
5. Have a vivid imagination (I)
6. Don't talk a lot (E)
7. Am not interested in other people's problems (A)
8. Often forget to put things back in their proper place (C)
9. Am relaxed most of the time (N)
10. Am not interested in abstract ideas (I)
11. Talk to a lot of different people at parties (E)

12. Feel others' emotions (A)

13. Like order (C)

14. Get upset easily (N)

15. Have difficulty understanding abstract ideas (I)

16. Keep in the background (E)

17. Am not really interested in others (A)

18. Make a mess of things (C)

19. Seldom feel blue (N)

20. Do not have a good imagination (I)

Note. (E) Extraversion; (A) Agreeableness; (C) Conscientiousness; (N) Neuroticism; (I) Intellect

APPENDIX I

COOK'S D OUTLIER ANALYSIS – PARTICIPANT 30 AS OUTLIER IN CONSISTENCY BETWEEN CONTEXTS BY NEUROTICISM REGRESSION



APPENDIX J

COOK'S D OUTLIER ANALYSIS – PARTICIPANTS 30, 43, 66, 69, AND 92 AS OUTLIERS IN CONSISTENCY BETWEEN CONTEXTS BY FIVE-FACTOR PERSONALITY TRAITS



APPENDIX K

THE SELF-PLURALISM SCALE-10 (MCREYNOLDS, ALTROCCHI, & HOUSE, 2000)

Directions: Listed below are a number of statements concerning how you may see yourself. Please read each item and decide whether the statement is *True* or *False* for you personally.

1. T/F: I am the same kind of person every way, day in and day out.
2. T/F*: People who know me well would say I act quite differently at different times.
3. T/F: Though I vary somewhat from time to time, in general I always feel much the same.
4. T/F: People who know me well would say I'm pretty predictable.
5. T/F*: There have been times when I felt like a completely different person from what I was the day before.
6. T/F: I act and feel essentially the same way whether at home, at work, or with friends.
7. T/F*: I get along best when I act and feel like a totally different person at different times.
8. T/F*: I sometimes have conflicts over whether to be one kind of person or a different kind.
9. T/F: I am the same sort of person regardless of whom I'm with.
10. T/F*: People who know me would say that my behavior changes from situation to situation.

Note. * reverse scored

APPENDIX L

BIG FIVE INVENTORY – II – PERSONALITY TRAITS (BFI-2; SOTO & JOHN, 2016)

Directions: Here are a number of characteristics that may or may not apply to you. For example, do you agree that you are someone who *likes to spend time with others?* Please write a number next to each statement to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with that statement.

1	2	3	4	5
Disagree Strongly	**Disagree a little**	**Neutral; no opinion**	**Agree a little**	**Agree Strongly**

Extraversion

Sociability

1. Is outgoing, sociable.
46. Is talkative.
16r. Tends to be quiet.
31r. Is sometimes shy, introverted.

Assertiveness

6. Has an assertive personality.
21. Is dominant, acts as a leader.
36r. Finds it hard to influence people.
51r. Prefers to have others take charge.

Energy Level

41. Is full of energy.
56. Shows a lot of enthusiasm.
11r. Rarely feels excited or eager.
26r. Is less active than other people.

Agreeableness

Compassion

2. Is compassionate, has a soft heart.
32. Is helpful and unselfish with others.

17r. Feels little sympathy for others.
47r. Can be cold and uncaring.

Respectfulness
7. Is respectful, treats others with respect.
52. Is polite, courteous to others.
22r. Starts arguments with others.
37r. Is sometimes rude to others.

Trust
27. Has a forgiving nature.
57. Assumes the best about people.
12r. Tends to find fault with others.
42r. Is suspicious of others' intentions.

Conscientiousness
Organization
18. Is systematic, likes to keep things in order.
33. Keeps things neat and tidy.
3r. Tends to be disorganized.
48r. Leaves a mess, doesn't clean up.

Productiveness
38. Is efficient, gets things done.
53. Is persistent, works until the task is finished.
8r. Tends to be lazy.
23r. Has difficulty getting started on tasks.

Responsibility
13. Is dependable, steady.
43. Is reliable, can always be counted on.
28r. Can be somewhat careless.
58r. Sometimes behaves irresponsibly.

Negative Emotionality
Anxiety
19. Can be tense.
34. Worries a lot.
4r. Is relaxed, handles stress well.
49r. Rarely feels anxious or afraid.

Depression
39. Often feels sad.
54. Tends to feel depressed, blue.

9r. Stays optimistic after experiencing a setback.
24r. Feels secure, comfortable with self.

Emotional Volatility
14. Is moody, has up and down mood swings.
59. Is temperamental, gets emotional easily.
29r. Is emotionally stable, not easily upset.
44r. Keeps their emotions under control.

Open-Mindedness
Intellectual Curiosity
10. Is curious about many different things.
40. Is complex, a deep thinker.
25r. Avoids intellectual, philosophical discussions.
55r. Has little interest in abstract ideas.

Aesthetic Sensitivity
20. Is fascinated by art, music, or literature.
35. Values art and beauty.
5r. Has few artistic interests.
50r. Thinks poetry and plays are boring.

Creative Imagination
15. Is inventive, finds clever ways to do things.
60. Is original, comes up with new ideas.
30r. Has little creativity.
45r. Has difficulty imagining things.

APPENDIX M

THE SELF-MONITORING SCALE (LENNOX, 1984)

0 1 2 3 4 5 6

Certainly, always false **Certainly, always true**

Ability to modify self-presentation

1. In social situations, I have the ability to alter my behavior if I feel that something else is called for.
2. I have the ability to control the way I come across to people, depending on the impression I want to give them.
3. When I feel that the image I am portraying isn't working, I can readily change it to something that does.
4. I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and different situations.*
5. I have found that I can adjust my behavior to meet the requirements of any situation I find myself in.
6. Even when it might be to my advantage, I have difficulty putting up a good front.*
7. Once I know what the situation calls for, it's easy for me to regulate my actions accordingly.

Sensitivity to expressive behavior of others

1. I am often able to read people's true emotions correctly through their eyes.
2. In conversations, I am sensitive to even the slightest change in the facial expression of the person I'm conversing with.
3. My powers of intuition are quite good when it comes to understanding others' emotions and motives.
4. I can usually tell when others consider a joke in bad taste, even though they may laugh convincingly.
5. I can usually tell when I've said something inappropriate by reading it in the listener's eyes.
6. If someone is lying to me, I usually know it at once from that person's manner of expression.

APPENDIX N

NEED FOR COGNITION SCALE (CACIOPPO ET AL., 1984)

Instructions: Please rate the extent to which you agree with each of 18 statements about the satisfaction you gain from thinking. There is no right or wrong answer, so please answer as honestly as possible.

+4 = very strong agreement
+3 = strong agreement
+2 = moderate agreement
+1 = slight agreement
0 = neither agreement nor disagreement
-1 = slight disagreement
-2 = moderate disagreement
-3 = strong disagreement
-4 = very strong disagreement

1. I would prefer complex to simple problems.
2. I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking.
3. Thinking is not my idea of fun.*
4. I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure to challenge my thinking abilities.*
5. I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is likely a chance I will have to think in depth about something.*
6. I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours.
7. I only think as hard as I have to.*
8. I prefer to think about small, daily projects to long-term ones.*
9. I like tasks that require little thought once I've learned them.*
10. The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me.
11. I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems.
12. Learning new ways to think doesn't excite me very much.*
13. I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve.
14. The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me.
15. I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is somewhat important but does not require much thought.

16. I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a lot of mental effort.*
17. It's enough for me that something gets the job done; I don't care how or why it works.*
18. I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me personally.

APPENDIX O

THEORIES OF INTELLIGENCE SCALE (DWECK, 2000)

Directions: The following questionnaire has been designed to investigate ideas about intelligence. There are no right or wrong answers. We are interested in your ideas. Using the scale below, please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements by writing the number that corresponds to your opinion in the space next to each statement.

1 2 3 4 5 6

Strongly Disagree **Strongly Agree**

_____. You have a certain amount of intelligence, and you can't really do much to change it.

_____. Your intelligence is something about you that you can't change very much.

_____. No matter who you are, you can significantly change your intelligence level.*

_____. To be honest, you can't really change how intelligent you are.

_____. You can always substantially change how intelligent you are. *

_____. You can learn new things, but you can't really change your basic intelligence.*

_____. No matter how much intelligence you have, you can always change it quite a bit.*

_____. You can change even your basic intelligence level considerably.*

Note. *reverse scored

APPENDIX P

CREATIVE PERSONALITY SCALE (GOUGH, 1979)

Directions: Please indicate which of the following adjectives best describe yourself. Check all that apply.

___+___ Capable	___-___ Honest
___-___ Artificial	___+___ Intelligent
___+___ Clever	___-___ Well-mannered
___-___ Cautious	___+___ Wide interests
___+___ Confident	___+___ Inventive
___+___ Egotistical	___+___ Original
___-___ Commonplace	___-___ Narrow interests
___+___ Humorous	___+___ Reflective
___-___ Conservative	___-___ Sincere
___+___ Individualistic	___+___ Resourceful
___-___ Conventional	___+___ Self-confident
___+___ Informal	___+___ Sexy
___-___ Dissatisfied	___-___ Submissive
___+___ Insightful	___+___ Snobbish
___-___ Suspicious	___+___ Unconventional

APPENDIX Q

ALTERNATIVE USES TASK INSTRUCTIONS

Instructions: In the following task, you will be asked to list as many alternative uses for a common object that you can in ten minutes. These uses should be different than the intended use: be as creative as possible.

Example: Here are some sample responses if the object were a brick.

A **brick** could be used as…

A paperweight;

A doorstop;

Like cymbals for music;

An anchor for a toy boat in a bubble bath;

A weapon

Remember, there are many different ways to be creative. Offering lots of alternative uses may indicate creativity. You could also offer very different types of alternative uses, even if the amount of solutions is lower. Going into detail or discussing the surrounding environment could indicate creativity. Finally, it could be that your idea is unique, something no one else has thought of. All of these types of responses can be considered creative.

Instructions: For the next ten minutes, please list as many alternative uses for an empty soda bottle as you can. Please list all examples in the free-response blank. Please separate all alternative uses with **semicolons (;)** and/or **use a new line**, so all your uses will be counted.

An **empty soda bottle** could be used as…

[Timed Task – 10 minutes: Free response]